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1 Introduction
Rapid growth of emerging markets is one of the most 
important trends of the world economy
But how long can their rapid growth continue?
Middle-income trap
All eyes are on China
Eichengreen, Park and Shin (2012) analyze the international 
historical experience of growth slowdowns up to 2007 to 
shed light on future growth prospects → based on PWT 6.3
Slowdowns occurred at a mean per capita GDP of USD 16,540 in 2005 
constant US dollars at PPP,  median of USD 15,085
China’s figure was USD 8,511 in 2007
Correlates of growth slowdowns
High growth in earlier period
Unfavorable demographics
Very high investment rates
Undervalued exchange rates
1 Introduction
In this paper, we re-visit these questions
Concerns about slows continue to grow, even for China
More and better data → updated through 2010
Additional determinants of growth slowdowns – level and structure of 
human capital, level and structure of exports, financial and political 
stability, and external shocks
Our new results are broadly consistent with our old results
Growth still slows down in the USD 15,000 range
But we find additional slowdown mode at around USD 11,000
Some interesting new findings
High quality human capital reduces probability of slowdowns
High-tech exports reduce probability of slowdowns
Less robustly,  financial crisis and political regime increase probability of 
slowdowns
1 Introduction
Outline of presentation
Data and methodology
New list of slowdowns and comparison with old list
Correlates
Regression analysis
Concluding observations
2 Data and methodology
Table 1. Old and New Slowdown 
Episodes
Year Growth before 
slowdown
(t-7 through t) 
Growth after 
slowdown 
(t through t+7)
Difference 
in growth 
Per capita 
GDP at tCountry
Penn World Table 
6.3
Penn World 
Table 7.1
Both
Argentina 1970* 3.6 1.5 -2.2 10,927 
1997* 4.3 -0.1 -4.5 12,778 
1998* 3.7 0.5 -3.2 13,132 
Australia 1968 4.0 -0.1 -4.0 19,553 
1969 3.9 -0.2 -4.1 20,409 
Austria 1960 6.4 3.5 -2.9 10,537 
1961 5.9 3.4 -2.5 11,042 
1974 4.8 2.5 -2.4 18,860 
1976 4.2 2.1 -2.1 18,615 
1977 4.0 1.6 -2.5 20,875 
Bahrain 1977 4.7 -3.0 -7.7 30,133 
1978 3.9 -6.2 -10.1 28,339 
Belgium 1973 4.7 2.5 -2.2 18,091 
1974 4.9 1.6 -3.3 18,852 
1976 3.9 1.1 -2.8 19,415 
Chile 1994* 5.9 3.9 -2.0 11,145 
1995* 6.5 2.8 -3.7 12,223 
1996* 6.1 2.3 -3.8 13,004 
1997* 6.6 2.3 -4.3 13,736 
1998* 6.1 2.7 -3.4 14,011 
2 Data and methodology
In some cases, a string of years are identified as slowdowns
We employ the Chow test for structural breaks to identify one year
We assign 1 for t, t-1 and t+1 and 0 otherwise
We remove data for t+2, ….., t+7 → transition period
The comparison group then consists of all countries that did not
experience a growth slowdown in that same year
The sample for the regression includes all countries for which the 
relevant data are available, including both slowdown countries and 
others that have never experienced a slowdown
A number of robustness checks
we also report the results when we do not employ the Chow test
we also report the results when oil countries are removed
Throughout, we report cluster-robust standard errors that account for 
the panel structure of the data set
3 Slowdowns
Second column in Table 1 reveals a number of new 
slowdowns
Austria in 1960 and Mexico in 1980
Sweden in mid-1960s, Hong Kong in 1981-1982, Oman in mid-1980s
In other cases, the new version of the Penn World Tables has 
smoothed previously erratic growth rates so that what were 
identified as slowdowns no longer qualify
Argentina both in 1970 and at the end of the 1990s, Chile in the mid-
1990s, Israel in 1996, Lebanon in 1985, Libya in the late 1970s 
(according to the more recent release, that country’s slowdown instead 
occurred in the mid-1990s), Malaysia in the mid-1990s, Mauritius in 
1992, Portugal in 2000, Spain in 1990, and Uruguay in the second half of 
the 1990s.
3 Slowdowns
Extending the data for three additional years through 2010 
allows us to analyze a number of recent slowdowns that 
previously went undetected
These include Estonia in 2002-3, Greece in 2003, Hungary in 2003, 
Spain in 2001 and the UK in 2002-3. 
That these are all European countries is revealing in light of recent 
events
In all but one case where the methodology picked out a string 
of successive slowdown years and these now remain the 
same, the Chow Test continues to identify the same unique 
break point as before. 
The one exception is South Korea.  While our methodology identifies 
the same string of years from 1989 through 1997 when Korean growth 
was at least two percentage points slower in the second of two 
successive seven year periods, the Chow Test previously identified 
1997 as the single most significant slowdown year; now, in contrast, it 
picks out 1989
3 Slowdowns
Slowdowns, when they occur, are large
In the new data set the per capita growth rate slows by 3.6 percentage 
points between successive seven year periods (oil exporters excluded) 
This is slightly larger than the average slowdown in the earlier data set
Figure 1 shows the per capita incomes at which growth rates 
slowed according to the Chow-Test break points
Now, in contrast to before, there appear to be two modes in the 
distribution of slowdown cases, one at a per capita GDP of 
approximately $11,000 and another at a per capita GDP of 
approximately $15,000.  
The mode around $15,000 is familiar; cases clustered there include 
New Zealand in 1960, Greece in 1972, Spain in 1975, Ireland in 1978, 
and Portugal in 1990 but also Cyprus in 1989, Gabon in 1974, Israel in 
1976, Oman in 1986, and Singapore in 1980.  Countries experiencing 
slowdown at the modal per capita income we identified previously are, 
clearly, a heterogeneous lot
Figure 1. Frequency Distribution of 
Growth Slowdowns 
3 Slowdowns
Figure 1 shows the per capita incomes at which growth rates 
slowed according to the Chow-Test break points
In contrast, the mode at $11,000 is new.  In part, it reflects the new 
dating for Korea, with the country’s growth slowdown estimated to 
have occurred in 1989 (at a per capita income of $10,570) rather than 
in 1997 (at a per capita income of $17,843), as noted above
In part it reflects the fact, also already noted, that Austria in 1960 and 
Mexico in 1980 were not considered previously because their per 
capita incomes were below the $10,000 cutoff according to PWT 6.3 
but are now slightly above according to the subsequent revision 
A number of other cases at what is now this second mode, Hungary in 
1978-9 and Puerto Rico in 1969 for example, were picked up 
previously, as were two oil exporters, Venezuela in 1974 and Iran in 
1977.  The countries clustered at this second mode are, again, quite 
heterogeneous
3 Slowdowns
While growth in some of the countries in our sample appears, 
according to these figures, to slow down at a unique point in 
time, quite a few experience multiple slowdowns.
Austria (1960 and 1974), Hungary (1977 and 2003), Greece (the 1970s 
and 2003), Japan (the early 1970s and early 1990s), New Zealand (1960 
and 1965-6), Norway (1976 and 1997-8), Portugal (1973-4 and 1990-2), 
Puerto Rico (1970-2, 1988-91 and 2000-3), Singapore (post 1978 and 
post-1993), Spain  (mid-1970s and 2001), and the UK (1988-9 and 
2002-3)
This substantial list suggests that two-step slowdowns are not 
uncommon  
4 Correlates
Table 2 summarizes the behavior of the independent variables 
in the full sample and the slowdown cases
At the time of their growth slowdowns, “slowdown countries” have a 
higher than average GDP per capita 
Their per capita incomes average two thirds those of the lead country 
(for most of the sample period the United States), compared to only 
one third for the control group of non-slowdown cases
They are growing faster than average, suggesting that growth 
slowdowns may have an element of mean reversion
In addition, while the country-year observations qualifying as 
slowdown cases are more open to trade than average, it does 
not appear that they are subject to larger or more variable 
terms-of-trade shocks
Slowdown countries are less likely than average to 
experience political changes, both positive (from autocracy to 
democracy) and negative (from democracy to autocracy)
Table 2.1. Summary Statistics, Full Sample
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Per capita GDP 5,028 7,024 8,475 161 46,318 
Ratio 5,028 0.26 0.30 0.00 1.44 
Pre-slowdown growth 4,207 0.04 0.03 -0.28 0.23 
Old dependency 4,739 9.96 5.91 2.35 28.87 
Young dependency 4,739 66.2 23.6 21.0 112.4 
Consumption share of GDP 5,028 0.71 0.13 0.04 1.00 
Investment share of GDP 5,028 0.22 0.10 -0.11 0.80 
Government share of GDP 5,028 0.10 0.07 0.01 0.59 
Inflation 3,904 0.47 2.79 -0.04 47.54 
Inflation variability 3,497 0.58 4.62 0.00 82.01 
Exchange rate variability 4,207 39.0 244.9 0.0 4846.2 
Undervaluation of real exchange rate 4,680 0.00 0.51 -6.92 2.27 
total years of schooling  4,593 5.48 3.00 0.13 12.71 
years of schooling, secondary and higher 4,593 1.75 1.43 0.02 7.35 
political change 4,578 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Positive political change 4,578 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Negative political change 4,578 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Trade Openness 5,028 0.54 0.39 0.012 3.740 
Lower 10% growth of terms of trade from t to t-1 3,584 0.10 0.30 0 1 
World GDP growth 3,922 3.17 1.34 0.42 6.58 
High technology export ratio 1,254 10.77 12.94 0.00 83.64 
Dummy for crisis (t) 5,028 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Dummy for crisis (t-1) 5,028 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Dummy for crisis (t-2) 5,028 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Table 2.2. Summary Statistics, Slowdown 
Countries
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Per capita GDP 146 18,234 7,140 10,074 43,927 
Ratio 146 0.67 0.18 0.31 1.20 
Pre-slowdown growth 143 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.12 
Old dependency 129 15.60 5.31 6.41 25.74 
Young dependency 129 38.00 10.32 21.35 86.80 
Consumption share of GDP 146 0.62 0.09 0.33 0.78 
Investment share of GDP 146 0.31 0.08 0.14 0.50 
Government share of GDP 146 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.25 
Inflation 126 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.21 
Inflation variability 123 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.14 
Exchange rate variability 143 5.90 16.49 0.00 76.99 
Undervaluation of real exchange rate 138 0.06 0.31 -0.45 1.02 
total years of schooling  135 8.17 1.90 3.86 11.50 
years of schooling, secondary and higher 135 2.91 1.19 0.71 5.53 
political change 127 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Positive political change 127 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Negative political change 127 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Trade Openness 146 0.75 0.71 0.09 3.23 
Lower 10% growth of terms of trade from t to t-1 121 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
World GDP growth 127 3.25 1.60 0.42 6.58 
High technology export ratio 45 24.60 15.00 3.53 57.02 
Dummy for crisis (t) 146 0.42 0.50 0 1 
Dummy for crisis (t-1) 146 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Dummy for crisis (t-2) 146 0.27 0.45 0 1 
4 Correlates
Our slowdown cases seem to have moved further up the 
technological ladder into the production and export of high 
tech products compared to the control group of countries
Consistent with this, our slowdown cases have higher average 
levels of education, both overall and in terms of average years 
completed of secondary and tertiary schooling
In contrast, there is not much of a difference in the simple 
incidence of financial crises between slowdown cases and the 
control group, although the frequency of financial crises 
either in the first year of the slowdown or one of the two 
years preceding is slightly higher in slowdown cases
5 Determinants
Table 3 replicates our earlier baseline regressions of the 
occurrence of a slowdown on per capita GDP and its square, 
expressed in levels and alternatively as a ratio to U.S. GDP 
per capita on the pre-slowdown growth rate in percentage 
points and additional controls
These are probit regressions, where in Table 3.1 all 
slowdown years identified by our criteria are coded as one, 
while in Table 3.2 we so code only the break point identified 
by the Chow Test
5 Determinants: Baseline results
Throughout, we report regression results both identifying 
strings of consecutive slowdown years and individual Chow-
Test dates
We also report regressions including both the level of per 
capita GDP and its ratio relative to the United States (some 
people preferring the latter)
While oil exporters are excluded in what follows, most of the 
results are, in fact, robust to their inclusion
5 Determinants: Baseline results
As before, both per capita GDP and its square enter with 
coefficients significantly different from zero at the 1 per cent
level, the level positively, the square negatively
When we include only the level and square of per capita GDP 
(column 1), the likelihood of a slowdown peaks at $17,900 
US dollars (year 2005), a higher level than in the raw data and 
higher than we found in our previous work
When we include other control variables, the peak is even 
higher, just over $20,000
In addition, the probability of a slowdown is significantly 
greater the higher pre-slowdown growth
Expressed in ratio form, the probability of a slowdown peaks 
when per capita GDP is roughly three-quarters that in the 
lead country (column 2)
5 Determinants: Baseline results
As before, we still find that a high investment ratio increases 
the likelihood of a slowdown over the relevant range.  This 
relationship is even stronger when we include just the linear 
term in the investment ratio.  In the raw data there is a 
tendency for the investment ratio to rise further from 
relatively high levels in the lead-up to slowdowns and to 
decline thereafter
Similarly, we again find that slowdowns are more likely in 
countries with undervalued exchange rates, other things 
equal (here, as before, undervaluation is calculated by 
regressing the real exchange rate on per capita GDP to 
account for Balassa-Samuelson effects, and taking the residual)
A high old-age dependency ratio similarly increases the 
likelihood of a slowdown, although this result is no long 
statistically significant at conventional confidence levels (it was 
only marginally significant in our earlier paper)
5 Determinants: Baseline results
Again as before, we find that slowdowns are less likely in 
more open economies over the relevant range, where this 
effect now registers at a higher level of statistical significance 
than previously, especially when we code as one the entire 
sequence of consecutive slowdown years
5 Determinants: Human capital
As shown in Table 4, years of schooling in total displays no 
evident association with slowdowns.  But when we include 
both total years of schooling and years of schooling at the 
secondary level and higher as separate variables, the latter is 
strongly negative: the more university attendees and 
graduates, on average, the less the likelihood of a slowdown
That the number of graduates of secondary schools and 
universities exerts this negative effect is intuitive: more 
advanced education may be especially valuable for middle-
income countries seeking to avoid a slowdown by moving 
into more the production of more technologically 
sophisticated goods and services
But why total years of schooling is positively (and in most 
cases significantly) associated with the probability of a 
slowdown after controlling separately for higher education is 
less intuitive
Table 4.The impact of human capital 
structure on growth slowdowns
Table 4.1.Probit regressions using 
consecutive points
Growth Slowdown
[1] [2] [3] [4]
per capita GDP 63.411** 62.769**
[13.940] [13.943]
per capita GDP² -3.165** -3.100**
[0.723] [0.717]
Pre-slowdown growth 62.008** 47.338** 69.881** 51.194**
[6.843] [6.456] [7.786] [6.577]
Ratio 20.094** 20.899**
[3.958] [3.572]
Ratio² -13.077** -13.161**
[3.115] [2.690]
total years of schooling  -0.09 0.049 0.16 0.292**
[0.089] [0.086] [0.116] [0.102]
years of schooling, secondary and 
higher
-0.594** -0.551**
[0.171] [0.157]
Observations 3565 3565 3565 3565
Table 4.2.Probit regressions using Chow 
test points
Growth Slowdown
[1] [2] [3] [4]
per capita GDP 34.410** 34.237**
[11.892] [11.423]
per capita GDP² -1.698** -1.669**
[0.623] [0.594]
Pre-slowdown growth 32.530** 30.113** 36.630** 33.587**
[5.961] [5.419] [6.332] [5.734]
Ratio 9.972** 10.393**
[1.569] [1.584]
Ratio² -5.273** -5.141**
[1.217] [1.040]
total years of schooling  -0.024 0.007 0.240** 0.266**
[0.067] [0.065] [0.091] [0.092]
years of schooling, secondary and 
higher
-0.554** -0.556**
[0.145] [0.144]
Observations 2970 2970 2970 2970
5 Determinants: Political regime change
We distinguish countries with positive political changes 
(movements away from autocracy and toward democracy) 
and negative political changes (movements away from 
democracy and toward autocracy)
In Table 5 we list slowdown cases where there was a political 
regime change in the preceding five years.  We see a large 
predominance of positive regime change cases
Table 6 shows the associated regressions.  Political change 
overall (both positive and negative) has no significant 
association with the probability of a slowdown.  But when we 
distinguish positive and negative changes, positive changes 
significantly increase the likelihood of a slowdown in one of 
our two specifications
Movements in the direction of democracy are sometimes 
associated increases in labor action and production costs – in 
Korea following democratization in 1987, for example
Table 5.Dating of Institutional Changes and 
Slowdowns country year per capita
GDP
pre 
growthrate
(t-7 to 0)
post 
growthrate
(0 to t+7)
Growth 
difference
positive 
regime 
change
negative 
regime 
change
Bahrain 1977 30,133 4.7 -3 -7.7 1 1
1978 28,339 3.9 -6.2 -10.1 0 1
Greece 1969 11,282 8.3 4.8 -3.5 0 1
1970 12,271 7.9 3.8 -4.1 0 1
1971 13,194 7.6 3.5 -4.1 0 1
Israel 1970 12,275 5.5 2.3 -3.2 0 1
1971 13,115 5.7 1.9 -3.8 0 1
Estonia 2002 12,526 7.1 3.9 -3.2 1 0
2003 13,591 7.4 3.2 -4.2 1 0
France 1973 18,225 4.5 2.3 -2.2 1 0
Gabon 1994 11,828 3.8 -1.7 -5.5 1 0
Greece 1974 14,304 6 2.1 -3.9 1 0
1975 14,988 5.6 1.2 -4.4 1 0
1976 15,819 4.8 0.1 -4.7 1 0
1977 15,955 3.8 0.2 -3.6 1 0
1978 16,910 3.5 -0.3 -3.8 1 0
Korea, 
Republic of
1989 10,570 8.8 6.7 -2.1 1 0
1990 11,643 8.8 5.7 -3.1 1 0
1991 12,714 9 2.8 -6.2 1 0
1992 13,077 8.5 4 -4.5 1 0
Kuwait 1993 45,376 6.4 -2.8 -9.2 1 0
1994 43,825 6.1 -2.5 -8.6 1 0
1995 43,893 6.3 -2.8 -9.1 1 0
1996 43,346 3.9 -0.3 -4.2 1 0
Mexico 1980 10,208 4.1 -2 -6.1 1 0
1981 10,882 4.4 -2.9 -7.3 1 0
Portugal 1974 10,238 7.4 1.5 -5.9 1 0
1977 10,086 3.8 0.9 -2.9 1 0
Spain 1975 15,123 4.7 0.4 -4.3 1 0
1976 15,463 3.9 0.2 -3.7 1 0
1977 15,549 3.5 0.3 -3.2 1 0
Taiwan 1992 15,609 7.5 4.8 -2.7 1 0
1993 16,512 6.9 4.8 -2.1 1 0
1994 17,581 6.4 3.4 -3 1 0
1995 18,542 6.5 3.3 -3.2 1 0
1996 19,361 5.9 3.1 -2.8 1 0
1997 20,330 5.7 3.3 -2.4 1 0
Table 6.The impact of political changes on growth 
slowdowns
Table 6.1.Probitregressions using consecutive points
Growth Slowdown
[1] [2] [3] [4]
per capita GDP 60.405** 59.503**
[13.946] [13.512]
per capita GDP² -3.023** -2.976**
[0.724] [0.702]
Pre-slowdown growth 60.802** 44.898** 62.266** 45.903**
[6.901] [5.952] [6.878] [6.061]
Ratio 19.838** 19.989**
[3.718] [3.806]
Ratio² -12.629** -12.719**
[2.957] [3.010]
political change 0.061 0.523
[0.263] [0.280]
Positive political change 0.196 0.698*
[0.283] [0.311]
Negative political change -0.643 -0.368
[0.492] [0.376]
Observations 3677 3677 3677 3677
Table 6.2.Probitregressions using Chow test points
Growth Slowdown
[1] [2] [3] [4]
per capita GDP 40.603** 39.390**
[13.282] [12.573]
per capita GDP² -2.005** -1.942**
[0.693] [0.658]
Pre-slowdown growth 37.337** 33.033** 38.118** 33.977**
[6.525] [5.829] [6.541] [5.977]
Ratio 11.554** 11.719**
[1.924] [1.976]
Ratio² -6.089** -6.184**
[1.365] [1.392]
political change 0.388 0.484
[0.281] [0.272]
Positive political change 0.580 0.704*
[0.300] [0.292]
Negative political change -0.505 -0.503
[0.455] [0.402]
Observations 2848 2848 2848 2848
5 Determinants: External factors
Table 7 looks more broadly at the role of external factors in 
precipitating growth slowdowns, distinguishing trade 
openness from terms-of-trade shocks and global GDP growth
The effect of trade openness is not consistent across 
specifications, but the likelihood of a slowdown is minimized 
at a trade (export plus import)-to-GDP ratio of 
approximately 1.3
the terms of trade shock varies in sign and is generally 
insignificant
The coefficient on global GDP growth also differs 
insignificantly from zero in most specifications, but where it is 
significant it is always negative, consistent with intuition
This more careful look at external factors thus confirms that 
these matter for growth slowdowns in the expected way, 
although precise effects are sensitive to sample and 
specification
Table 7.The Impact of external shocks on growth 
slowdowns
Table 7.1 Probit regressions using consecutive 
points
Growth Slowdown
[1] [2] [3] [4]
per capita GDP 61.393** 60.946**
[16.799] [17.620]
per capita GDP² -3.076** -3.045**
[0.874] [0.915]
Pre-slowdown growth 68.133** 58.029** 71.487** 61.564**
[8.269] [8.341] [9.429] [9.649]
Ratio 18.388** 20.283**
[3.502] [4.563]
Ratio² -11.366** -13.011**
[2.761] [3.763]
Trade openness -1.414* -0.970* -1.127 -0.653
[0.581] [0.493] [0.653] [0.570]
Trade openness² 0.509** 0.363* 0.416* 0.254
[0.188] [0.157] [0.204] [0.177]
Lower 10% growth of terms of trade from t to t-1 0.006 -0.234 0.169 -0.156
[0.429] [0.363] [0.446] [0.363]
World GDP growth -0.107 -0.159
[0.146] [0.121]
Observations 3083 3083 2726 2726
Table 7.2 Probit regressions using Chow test points
Growth Slowdown
[1] [2] [3] [4]
per capita GDP 31.081* 27.964*
[13.431] [12.850]
per capita GDP² -1.527* -1.374*
[0.710] [0.683]
Pre-slowdown growth 36.121** 34.553** 38.622** 36.679**
[7.785] [7.467] [8.291] [7.884]
Ratio 9.061** 10.016**
[1.546] [2.127]
Ratio² -4.460** -5.497**
[1.124] [1.937]
Trade openness -1.338* -1.132* -1.326 -1.135
[0.583] [0.541] [0.677] [0.619]
Trade openness² 0.469 0.405 0.452 0.386
[0.245] [0.229] [0.268] [0.245]
Lower 10% growth of terms of trade from t to t-1 0.446 0.26 0.418 0.216
[0.390] [0.308] [0.389] [0.313]
World GDP growth -0.224 -0.24
[0.129] [0.128]
Observations 2458 2458 2102 2102
5 Determinants:  Tech. content of exports 
An important challenge for middle-income countries seeking 
to maintain their customary high growth rates is to move up 
the technological ladder into the production of more 
technologically sophisticated goods, in part in order to get 
out of the way of lower-cost developing countries beginning 
to penetrate global markets for low-tech products (assembly 
operations and the like)
In Tables 8.1 and 8.2 we therefore report regressions that 
include the share of high tech exports as a share of total 
manufactured exports
In Table 8.2, where we use the Chow-Test approach to 
identify unique slowdown years, the results suggest that 
middle-income countries with a relatively large share of high-
tech exports are less susceptible to slowdowns
The results in Table 8.1 are less supportive of the hypothesis
Table 8.The Impact of the high-technology exports 
ratio on growth slowdowns
Table 8.1 Probitregressions using consecutive 
points
Growth Slowdown
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
per capita GDP 52.635* 50.624* 55.220* 52.809*
[25.025] [24.253] [26.674] [25.603]
per capita GDP² -2.563* -2.474* -2.692* -2.583*
[1.275] [1.243] [1.356] [1.309]
Pre-slowdown growth 89.331** 89.517** 92.160** 92.304** 68.676** 70.432** 69.835** 71.232**
[15.265] [15.633] [16.100] [16.578] [11.094] [12.722] [11.329] [13.090]
Ratio 13.757** 14.392** 13.984** 14.572**
[3.802] [4.118] [3.868] [4.187]
Ratio² -8.112* -8.673* -8.266* -8.788*
[3.199] [3.492] [3.239] [3.522]
High technology export 
ratio
-0.009 0.04 0.031 0.076 -0.008 0.045 0.011 0.058
[0.019] [0.048] [0.025] [0.053] [0.017] [0.035] [0.019] [0.031]
Trade openness 0.772 0.759 1.887 1.866
[1.760] [1.788] [1.457] [1.458]
Trade openness² -0.049 -0.045 -0.444 -0.439
[0.470] [0.473] [0.404] [0.404]
Trade openness*high 
technology export ratio
-0.075 -0.074 -0.1 -0.098
[0.064] [0.064] [0.056] [0.056]
Trade openness²*high 
technology export ratio
0.017 0.017 0.029 0.028
[0.016] [0.016] [0.018] [0.018]
World GDP growth 0.053 0.033 -0.002 0.011
[0.157] [0.161] [0.118] [0.112]
World GDP growth*high 
technology export ratio
-0.014* -0.013* -0.007 -0.005
[0.007] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005]
Observations 1187 1187 1187 1187 1187 1187 1187 1187
Table 8.2 Probitregressions using Chow test points
Growth Slowdown
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
per capita GDP 10.468 12.416 10.306 12.26
[15.741] [15.314] [15.847] [15.193]
per capita GDP² -0.375 -0.476 -0.366 -0.469
[0.829] [0.809] [0.835] [0.802]
Pre-slowdown growth 98.818** 104.585** 98.375** 103.612** 93.260** 96.438** 92.930** 95.290**
[16.528] [23.665] [17.501] [24.929] [18.727] [25.929] [19.566] [27.030]
Ratio 12.889** 13.557** 12.877** 13.392**
[3.623] [4.802] [3.641] [4.903]
Ratio² -5.618* -6.105* -5.590* -6.007*
[2.359] [2.890] [2.332] [2.907]
High technology export 
ratio
-0.055** -0.005 -0.091** -0.018 -0.054** -0.006 -0.091** -0.026
[0.018] [0.062] [0.033] [0.068] [0.020] [0.060] [0.033] [0.071]
Trade openness 0.037 0.028 0.563 0.514
[2.927] [2.916] [2.744] [2.758]
Trade openness² 0.677 0.669 0.44 0.44
[0.960] [0.958] [0.898] [0.899]
Trade openness*high 
technology export ratio
-0.068 -0.066 -0.069 -0.066
[0.095] [0.095] [0.096] [0.097]
Trade openness²*high 
technology export ratio
0.005 0.005 0.007 0.007
[0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026]
World GDP growth -0.976* -0.716* -0.878* -0.664*
[0.455] [0.319] [0.434] [0.335]
World GDP 
growth*high technology 
export ratio
0.012 0.004 0.013 0.006
[0.010] [0.008] [0.010] [0.009]
Observations 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800
5 Determinants:  Financial instability 
Table 9 shows the distribution of crises around our Chow 
Test slowdown dates.  Most types of crises – currency crises, 
banking crises, debt crises, inflation crises – accompany only a 
relatively small minority of our slowdown cases
Stock market crises or crashes are clearly different; there is a
relatively high incidence of these both before and after our 
slowdown episodes
Table 10 reports the associated regression results.  The crisis 
dummy lagged one year is positive and consistently significant 
at a relatively high level of confidence when we consider the 
entire sequence of slowdown years.  The other results 
reported previously remain intact
Table 9.Crises and slowdowns
Consecutive Slowdown Points Chow Test Slowdown Points
t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2
Not during
t-2~t+2
t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2
Not during 
t-2~t+2
Currency Crisis 7 3 5 9 12 76 2 1 1 2 4 19
Banking Crisis 4 4 8 12 15 83 1 1 2 1 4 21
Stock Crisis 33 41 57 58 46 19 4 8 14 15 12 5
Inflation Crisis 1 2 5 6 5 93 0 1 3 1 2 23
Domestic debt Crisis 0 0 0 1 1 105 0 0 0 1 0 26
External debt Crisis 0 0 0 1 2 105 0 0 0 1 1 26
Any of the sixcrises 40 47 62 67 59 15 6 10 15 16 16 3
5 Determinants:  Financial instability 
To shed some light on the channels through which crises may 
lead to slowdowns, we added the investment ratio both 
before and after the year of the observation to this 
specification
Specifically, we added two variables, one the average 
investment-to-GDP ratio over the preceding seven years, the 
other the average investment-to-GDP ratio over the 
subsequent seven years
In this augmented specification, the investment ratio tends to 
enter positively before the slowdown (as before) but 
negatively thereafter; both measures are generally statistically
significant at the ten per cent confidence level or better
Importantly, the crisis variable no longer differs from zero at 
conventional confidence levels
Therefore, crises may lead to slowdowns by depressing 
investment for an extended period
6 Concluding observations
Rapid growth in emerging markets is perhaps the single most 
important economic development affecting the world’s 
population in the last quarter century
An important question is therefore “How long will it last?”
Interest in this question has intensified with the deterioration
in the global outlook following the onset of the global financial 
crisis
Even China, the largest and most dynamic emerging market, 
has seen slower economic growth since the crisis, although 
opinion is divided over what this implies for the future
Much of the literature on this topic flies under the heading of 
“the middle income trap”
The troubled global outlook now poses a risk that even 
dynamic middle income economies like China might become 
trapped 
6 Concluding observations
In this paper we have again considered what history has to 
say about this question, revisiting the incidence and correlates
of growth slowdowns
In contrast to our earlier results, which pointed to the 
existence of a single mode around $15,000-$16,000 
purchasing power parity 2005 dollars at which slowdowns 
typically occur, our new analysis points to the existence of 
two modes, one in the $10,000-$11,000 range and another 
around $15,000-$16,0000”
The new analysis again confirms that slowdowns are more 
likely in economies with high old age dependency ratios, high 
investment rates that may translate into low future returns 
on capital, and undervalued real exchange rates that provide a 
disincentive to move up the technology ladder
6 Concluding observations
In addition, we find that slowdowns are less likely in countries
with high levels of tertiary education and where high-tech 
products account for a large share of exports, consistent with 
our earlier emphasis of the importance of moving up the 
technology ladder in order to avoid the middle income trap
What do these new results imply for China?  China has 
slightly higher average years of schooling at the secondary 
level than the median for our slowdown cases (3.17 years in 
China versus 2.72 years in our slowdown cases). It has a 
higher share of high-tech goods in exports (27.5 per cent in 
China versus 24.1 in our slowdown cases).  In this sense 
China appears to be doing slightly better than average in 
moving up the technology ladder so as to avoid the middle-
income trap
6 Concluding observations
Our finding that high quality human capital reduces the 
probability of a slowdown seems intuitive. Skilled workers are 
needed to move up the value chain from low value-added 
industries and activities. High quality human capital is 
especially important for modern high value-added activities 
like business services
Even emerging markets that have achieved rapid 
improvement in overall education attainment can suffer from 
shortages of specific kinds of skilled workers. ADB (2008) 
warns that such shortages are sufficiently prevalent to pose a 
risk to growth in China and other parts of emerging Asia
That a large share of high-tech exports reduces the likelihood 
of a slowdown points to the same conclusion. Intuitively, the 
inherited stock of human capital shapes a country’s ability to 
move up the technology ladder and its capacity export 
products embodying advanced technology
6 Concluding observations
Other variables, from political regime changes and financial 
instability to trade openness, terms-of-trade shocks and 
global growth, also show some association with growth 
slowdowns.  But compared to educational attainment and the 
structure of exports, they are less robustly related
At some point, high growth in low- and middle-income 
countries will come to an end. But this does not mean that a 
slowdown at a specific income level is inevitable. Not all 
countries are equally susceptible
Countries accumulating high quality human capital and moving 
into the production of higher tech exports stand a better 
chance of avoiding the middle income trap
